TL422

Republic of Indonesia

East Timor:
Building for the Future

Issues and Perspectives

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
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PREFACE

This report details the history, society, culture, political structure and development of the Indonesian province of East Timor.

Over the past 20 years, considerable debate and misinformation have muddled the issues involving East Timor, overshadowing the aspirations of the East Timorese people whose welfare has been an important priority of the Indonesian Government.

Repeatedly, propaganda and rhetoric have colored history in a transparent attempt to compensate for a self-serving and irresponsible display of political opportunism on the part of Portugal. The impact has been most severe on a people who have been buffeted by those attempting to disrupt their desire for peace, tranquility and socioeconomic progress.

This record must be set straight.

The facts about East Timor are presented in the following pages. They stand as a comprehensive reply to the distortions and allegations that have been mounted by those who oppose peace, stability and progress in East Timor. Many of these allegations and distortions demand a direct response:

- **Why did the Portuguese leave East Timor?**

  What is described as a "process of decolonization" by Portugal deserves rather to be termed a record of failure and ineptitude. In August 1975, the colonial authorities in Dili, in a most irresponsible manner, simply packed up and left East Timor, after allowing the situation in the territory to deteriorate to the point of civil war. Portugal was, in fact, guilty of practically instigating civil war by secretly turning over its arms and ammunition to one particular minority group, FRETILIN. This development can be seen as the culmination of centuries of colonial neglect and a completely bungled decolonization process. By utterly failing in its responsibility, Portugal in fact has forfeited any right to be still considered the "administering power" of East Timor.

  In the face of this, the East Timorese people had rightly assumed their inherent right to decolonize themselves, considering themselves no longer bound to any decolonization covenant with the erstwhile colonial power. This they did by choosing independence through integration with Indonesia in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and Principles VI, VIII and IX of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) and as further confirmed by the relevant provisions of General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV).

- **Why and how did Indonesia become involved?**

  - In the wake of Portugal's abdication of responsibility, Indonesia was confronted by a situation that was neither desired nor of its making, but that threatened seriously to disrupt the national development and reconstruction efforts in which it was engaged after the ravages of the 1965/1966 abortive coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

  - Sharing the western part of the same island, Indonesia was forced to shoulder the burdens and consequences of civil war right at its doorstep, in the form of thousands of refugees flooding into West Timor, armed skirmishes at its border and the prospect of prolonged political strife, economic upheaval and foreign interference.

  - Indonesia was explicitly asked to respond to the request for integration by the legitimate representatives of the overwhelming majority of the people of East Timor.

  - East Timor's process of integration into the Republic of Indonesia has conformed with the letter and spirit of the United Nations resolutions on decolonization, and the United Nations was fully informed of every step in this long and difficult process.

  - Indonesia from the outset supported the efforts of the new government of Portugal to decolonize East Timor and time and again reaffirmed its readiness to cooperate with Portugal in the peaceful and orderly implementation of the process of decolonization. Indeed, at the request of Portugal, Indonesia extended its active cooperation to the process as *inter alia* evidenced by the series of meetings held between high-level representatives of the two sides in New York, September 1974; Lisbon, October 1974; London, March 1975; Jakarta, August and September 1975; and Rome, November 1975.

  - In fact, as late as in November 1975, three months after Portugal's abandonment of East Timor, at a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in Rome, Indonesia still urged Portugal to return to East Timor in order to complete the decolonization process in a just and orderly manner. Portugal, however, again failed to make good on its own promise.

- Indonesia's subsequent involvement in East Timor can, therefore, be seen as endeavoring to respond, in as restrained a manner as possible, to the chaotic and tragic circumstances that unfortunately accompanied the decolonization process in East Timor.

- Thus, far from "disrupting the decolonization process" or from "annexing, invading or illegally occupying" another independent state, as some have spuriously charged, Indonesia's involvement in East Timor was, on the contrary, one of contributing to the process of decolonization in that territory, *inter alia*, by helping to ensure that the democratically expressed will of the majority of the people not be overruled by the armed terror and unilateral imposition of a ruthless minority.

• How has Indonesia helped East Timor?

Every part of the archipelago that is the Republic of Indonesia has been an integral and self-determining part of this strong and unified nation. It has been and remains a goal of Indonesia to ensure that the benefits of development reach every part of our vast country, proportionate to the needs. Indeed, that is the single reason why East Timor receives the largest amount of development funds on a per capita basis, an investment that has produced hospitals, schools, roads and commerce when little to none had existed under Portuguese rule.

• What about the "population discrepancy"?

Of all the numerous myths about East Timor developed and disseminated by Indonesia's detractors, none is more malicious and misleading than the endlessly repeated allegation of the number of lives lost in East Timor during and after the process of integration. These critics charge that East Timor's population decreased by 200,000 or more, thus implying that about one-third of the population has either perished or disappeared and that Indonesia should be held responsible for this. Some even go so far as recklessly accusing Indonesia of "genocide."

Not only does this juggling of numbers represent a shameless distortion of the tragic facts surrounding Portugal's mishandled decolonization of East Timor, but it also shows a complete and often deliberate misreading of the process of population surveying and census-taking that has taken place prior to and following the departure of the colonial government.

The only internationally accepted census of East Timor was taken in 1980 as part of a nationwide count carried out by the Government of Indonesia. The resulting population figure — 555,350 persons — seemed to show a decline of some 69,000 from the last colonial estimate of 624,564. The true difference will never be known: colonial authorities themselves acknowledged that their figures for 1974 and earlier were estimates based on reports by "liurais" (village headmen), whose counts were never verified by the Portuguese Government. In any case, any drop in the population of East Timor was much lower than the distorted figures disseminated by these critics.

In 1976, a spokesman of the East Timor provisional government was quoted in the international press as having said that "60,000 had been killed" in East Timor. The next day, however, the same spokesman said that the press had misquoted him, for what he in fact had stated was that 60,000 had "lost their lives or homes" and this figure included the 40,000 refugees who had fled to West Timor.

These figures and the apparent short-fall in population have subsequently been eagerly seized upon by Indonesia's critics and, through a process of mutual citation, have not only been constantly repeated but gradually exaggerated to reach what has now become the fabricated and completely unsubstantiated claim of 200,000 lives lost.

It is a sad fact that the tragedy that engulfed the East Timorese people after 1974 did exact a regrettable toll in human lives. It should be borne in mind, however, that two key factors contributed to any real changes in East Timor's population:

- First, the civil war that raged in East Timor in 1975-1976 claimed many lives directly and indirectly. Not only did many East Timorese die as a result of the FRETILIN reign of terror, but many also delayed plans for marriage and child-bearing, and many families were separated. As a result, the 1980 census showed that children younger than five years old accounted for only 14.15 percent of the total population, well below the percentage in other provinces. The hunger and disease caused by the disruption of civil war were joined by acts of FRETILIN aggression as major direct causes of loss of life. As might be expected in a violent and chaotic security situation, an abnormally low birthrate was an indirect result of the ongoing civil war.

- Second, thousands of refugees flooded across the border to West Timor during and immediately after the war. They either settled in West Timor or emigrated to other parts of Indonesia or other countries. A large number of East Timorese and Portuguese nationals have also emigrated to other countries or returned to Portugal under the repatriation and family reunion program initiated in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Careful examination of the facts by several observers, including respected Western journalists, suggests that war-related deaths numbered around 5,000, with another 25,000 victims of malnutrition and disease brought about by a war-ravaged economy and a gross lack of health care services. That people have died is tragic enough, but the deliberate manipulation of the number of victims is highly irresponsible and simply dishonest. It is to be hoped, therefore, that this unsavory numbers game can finally be put to an end.

- **How are the cultural and social traditions of the East Timorese protected?**

The allegation that the East Timorese are different from other Indonesians ignores the fact that Indonesia is a land of diversity, comprising 300 distinct ethnic groups and almost as many languages. People of the same Melanesian ancestry, and with the same culture, language base and customs, inhabit the western part of Timor island and the surrounding islands of eastern Indonesia.

Since East Timor was integrated into the Republic of Indonesia, the Government has worked carefully to ensure that cultural traditions are maintained, local languages are preserved and religious practices are respected. This has included support for cultural institutions and organizations, expansion of economic opportunities for those involved in commercialization of traditional handicrafts and financial support for the construction and rehabilitation of facilities of worship in all the major faiths represented in the province.

East Timor, like the rest of Indonesia, is a province of extraordinary ethnic, religious and cultural diversity — a piece of the extraordinary mosaic that is the pride of Indonesia. And in this diversity, no one group is dominant. Respect and tolerance for different cultural and religious traditions is at the heart of the national philosophy. This protection and nurturing in East Timor cannot be denied.

- **What were the actions taken in connection with the November 12, 1991, incident in Dili?**

The tragic outcome of the demonstration that occurred in Dili, East Timor, on the 12th of November 1991 was deeply regrettable, as was immediately and repeatedly expressed by the Indonesian Government at the highest levels. Most unfortunately, the demonstration was not entirely peaceful and indeed displayed premeditated provocation and belligerence. It triggered a spontaneous reaction by some security personnel, acting outside the control or command of senior officers, and resulted in a deplorable loss of lives and a number of wounded people. It was a tragic incident and clearly not an act ordered by or reflecting the policy of the Government or the Armed Forces.

Nothing can be done to alter the facts of the incident: The test is in how the Indonesian Government and people responded — by acting firmly and swiftly to get the facts, by establishing a National Committee of Inquiry and a Military Council of Honor, and by initiating a due legal process, subjecting all those held accountable for having violated the law, whether on the part of the demonstrators or on the part of the security personnel, to trial by the appropriate courts of justice. This legal process shall be pursued in accordance with the Rule of Law, the Pancasila State Philosophy, the 1945 Constitution and the relevant Penal Codes upon which the Republic of Indonesia is based.

- **What is Indonesia's position on human rights?**

As a conscientious member of the United Nations and, since 1991, a member of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Indonesia accepts and recognizes the universal validity of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. But, as the United Nations rightly enjoins us to do, the promotion and observation of human rights should be put within the context of international cooperation. And, international cooperation presupposes as a basic condition respect for the sovereignty of states and the national identity of peoples.

Human rights values are essentially ethical and moral in nature. Hence, any approach to human rights issues with different intentions or ulterior motivations, in other words, politically motivated intentions, should be eschewed.

Human rights are vital and important by and for themselves. Indonesia, therefore, cannot accept linking questions of human rights to other issues, such as to economic and development cooperation, or worse, making them into political conditionalities to such cooperation, as such linkages will detract from the value of both.

As is well known, there are various categories of human rights: civil and political rights, economic and social rights, the rights of the individual human being and the rights of the community, the society and the nation. It is universally accepted that all these categories of rights are indivisible and inter-related, and that there should be balance in the appreciation and promotion of all these rights in their integral whole. Undue emphasis on one category of human rights over another cannot be justified. In assessing the human rights conditions of countries, and of developing countries in particular, the international community should, therefore, take into account the situation in relation to all categories of human rights.

This is consistent with the basic principles contained in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948. Article 29 of that declaration addresses two aspects that balance each other: On the one hand, there are principles that respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual; on the other, there are stipulations regarding the obligations of the individual toward society and the state.

It is clear, therefore, that implementation of human rights implies the existence of a balanced relationship between individual human rights and the obligations of individuals toward their community. Without such a balance, the rights of the community as a whole can be denied, which can lead to instability and anarchy, especially in developing countries.

While human rights are indeed universal in character, it is generally acknowledged that their expression and implementation in the national context should remain the competence and responsibility of each government while taking into account the complex variety of problems, of different economic, social and cultural realities, and of different value systems prevailing in each country. This national competence not only derives from the principle of sovereignty of states, but is also a logical consequence of the principle of self-determination.

In Indonesia, as in many other developing countries, the rights of the individual are balanced by the rights of the community, in other words, balanced by the obligation equally to respect the rights of others, the rights of the society and the rights of the nation. This does not only conform to the cultural traditions and customs prevalent in most developing countries where, often, the interests and the rights of the community prevail over those of the individual, but is also fully in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Moreover, in the application of human rights in developing countries including our own, it should be borne in mind that in most of these countries there are other fundamental rights and concerns besides certain civil and political freedoms to which equally urgent attention should be given, such as the right of the vast majority of the people to be free from want, from hunger, from ignorance, from disease and backwardness. Attention must also be given to the right to development and the right to be free from external political and economic coercion in pursuit of development in an atmosphere of peace and national stability. Precisely because human rights are indivisible no singular emphasis should be put on certain aspects of those rights.

Indonesia is of the firm view that in evaluating the application and implementation of human rights in individual countries, the characteristic problems of developing countries in general, as well as the specific problems of individual societies should be taken fully into account. Similarly, there should be a balanced approach towards respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the rights and interests of society, of the nation as a whole.

Finally, the primary objective of actions in the field of human rights is not to accuse nor to assume the role of judge and jury over other countries but together to develop a common consciousness in the international community and to encourage improvement in the observance of these fundamental rights and freedoms. We should not try to remake the world in our own image, but we can and should try to make the world a more humane, peaceful and equitably prosperous place for all.

For its part, the Indonesian Government has consistently endeavored to adhere to the humanitarian precepts and basic human rights and freedoms embodied in its State Philosophy, Pancasila, its 1945 Constitution and its national laws and regulations. Indeed, these precepts, rights and freedoms, as embodied in the constitutional and legal system, derive from age-old traditions, customs and the philosophy of life of the Indonesian people.

The philosophical basis of Indonesia, Pancasila, which translates to Five Pillars or Five Principles, embraces humanitarian precepts that are mutually interlinked and inseparable. These five principles are:

o Belief in one, supreme God

o Just and civilized humanity

o The unity of Indonesia

o Democracy, led by the inner wisdom of unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives

o Social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people

The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on Pancasila, also contains humanitarian precepts and basic principles of human rights. These principles have been incorporated into a number of national laws and regulations. It is also important to note that the 1945 Constitution has many principles that are similar to those contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

As in many developing countries, Indonesia's culture and its ancient and well-developed customs have traditionally put high priority on the rights and interests of the community. This means that the interests of the majority often prevail over individual or group interests without, however, in any way harming the rights and interests of those individuals and groups. Individual and group rights are always fully taken into account, based on the principle of "musyawarah-mufakat," which translates to deliberations to attain consensus and which is firmly embedded in the nation's socio-political system and unique form of democracy.

- **Is Indonesia willing to resolve the dispute with Portugal?**

Although at the time of the last voting on the East Timor issue at the U.N. General Assembly in 1982 Portugal was hardly in a position of strength on the issue, Indonesia agreed to the appeal by the then-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Perez de Cueller, to start a dialogue with Portugal under his auspices. The purpose was to find a peaceful, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution, under the general mandate of the Secretary-General, through dialogue rather than through continuing sterile debate in the General Assembly.

Since 1983, we have been engaged in such a tri-partite dialogue between Indonesia, Portugal and the U.N. Secretary-General, under the general mandate as referred to above and not on the basis of or pursuant to any specific General Assembly resolutions. This dialogue has been, on the whole, a constructive one as it contributed to removing any earlier misunderstandings and to resolving many outstanding humanitarian issues.

Although in the course of that dialogue Indonesia has been deeply disappointed on two occasions by Portugal's reneging on earlier understandings reached in the course of these discussions, we believe a resumption of such a dialogue on the same basis and under the same modalities as before, would be a worthwhile endeavor to pursue. However, it would be difficult to resume such a dialogue if it were to be based on other premises and if additional aspects were to be proposed to its modalities.

In short, it is Indonesia's view that any resumption of the dialogue should remain an effort of, and be personally led by, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his designated deputy, and not become a mediation effort by third parties. It should also remain strictly tri-partite in nature.

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Not all readers of this volume will accept every statement; nor should they. History is a stern master, worth studying in all its variety and subtlety. But history rests on fundamental facts; it is the interpretation that leads to personal conclusions. It is the aim of this report to facilitate that study and interpretation in the interests of the people of East Timor.

AN EAST TIMOR CHRONOLOGY

1509–1974

Period of Portuguese colonial presence.

1633

First Portuguese settlement on East Timor.

1769

Portugal establishes Dili as the capital of East Timor.

1896

Portugal separates East Timor as a colony from Macau.

1910

First major rebellion against Portuguese rule on East Timor is violently suppressed after 18 months.

1942–1945

Japanese occupy Indonesia, driving out Portuguese from East Timor.

August 17, 1945

Indonesia proclaims its independence from the Netherlands. War of liberation begins.

August 1945

People of East Timor begin their own rebellion against Portuguese rule. The rebellion is brutally suppressed.

December 27, 1949

The Netherlands agrees to end its attempt to thwart creation of an independent Indonesia. Sovereignty is formally transferred to the new republic. East Timor remains under Portuguese rule.

April-May 1974

Portugal's government is overthrown and the new regime announces democratic rights would be given its overseas territories, including Portuguese Timor.

September–October 1974

First Indonesian-Portuguese talks are held on decolonization of East Timor.

May–November 1974

Five political parties are organized in East Timor in preparation for self-determination.

March 1975

First scheduled referendum on independence is suppressed by Portuguese military in East Timor. Pro-Portuguese FRETILIN party begins series of terrorist attacks on political opponents.

August 10, 1975

UDT forces, learning of FRETILIN plans for a coup, take pre-emptive action and stage large demonstrations.

August 20, 1975

FRETILIN forces seize control of the capital, touching off civil war.

August 26, 1975

Portuguese government abandons Dili, rather than attempt to restore order. Governor and staff return to Lisbon.

August 29, 1975

In bilateral talks, Indonesia urges return and re-establishment of Portuguese authority over the territory in order to complete the decolonization process, but Portugal fails to re-establish its presence.

August–October 1975

FRETILIN forces expand their attacks throughout East Timor. Thousands of refugees flee to Indonesian West Timor. In their pursuit, FRETILIN forces stage raids across frontier.

November 28, 1975

FRETILIN issues unilateral declaration of independence without benefit of any act of self-determination.

November 29, 1975

Portugal proclaims itself the administering power in East Timor three months after abandoning the territory. It still refuses to send any forces or any officials to restore order.

November 30, 1975

Four other parties, including UDT, issue their proclamation of independence and simultaneous integration with the Republic of Indonesia, and with Indonesian volunteers begin process of restoring order in the territory.

December 7, 1975

Dili is retaken from FRETILIN forces, and 10 days later Provisional Government of East Timor is proclaimed. Four months of bloodshed are ended.

January 15, 1976

U.N. Special Representative Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi arrives to assess situation, meets with Foreign Minister Adam Malik, reports back that situation is inconclusive.

January 20–22, 1976

U.N. Special Representative meets leaders of the Provisional Government in Dili, as well as with several FRETILIN leaders in Oecussi, Atauro, Manatuto, Baucau and Dili.

February 1, 1976

U.N. Special Representative visits Australia and meets with representatives from FRETILIN in Darwin and Melbourne.

April–May 1976

Letters sent repeatedly to the United Nations by the Provisional Government requesting observers for election of a People's Assembly and its vote on self-determination are met with refusals.

May 31, 1976

The elected People's Assembly votes to request integration of the territory into the Republic of Indonesia.

June 5, 1976

A delegation of the people of East Timor, led by Mr. Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, Chief Executive of the Provisional Government of East Timor, arrives in Jakarta to present the petition calling for immediate integration of East Timor with Indonesia.

June 23, 1976

Fact-finding team of Indonesian MPs and Government officials, led by Minister for Internal Affairs Amir Mahmud, arrives in East Timor to assess the situation.

July 17, 1976

President Soeharto formally proclaims East Timor Indonesia's 27th province.

1976–1979

Period of emergency assistance to refugees from civil war, establishment of administrative structures and inauguration of economic development and social welfare programs throughout the province.

Fall 1982

At 37th session of the U.N. General Assembly, opponents of East Timor's integration with Indonesia muster only 30 percent of vote in censure motion.

Fall 1984

Indonesian and Portuguese representatives begin series of discussions at the United Nations dealing with situation in East Timor and repatriation of former Portuguese civil servants still residing there.

December 1986

After more than 12 rounds of talks under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General, it is agreed a U.N. team will observe voting in East Timor during the April 1987 Indonesian General Elections.

March 1987

During 14th round of talks, Portugal rejects U.N. observation plan. Instead Portugal proposes an observation mission from its own Parliament. Discussions continue over next four-and-a-half years.

October 12, 1989

Twenty youths stage anti-Indonesian demonstration during visit of Pope John Paul II in Dili.

November 4, 1989

Some 50 youths stone police officers in Dili.

January 17–19, 1990

About 50 youths stage demonstration and 250 subsequently march through Dili during visit of U. S. Ambassador.

September 1990

Following negotiations at the United Nations, Indonesia agrees to terms for Portuguese Parliamentary visit to East Timor. Portugal promises early response.

September 4, 1990

Pro-FRETILIN demonstration by about 200 youths follows mass commemorating 50 years of the Dili diocese.

October 8, 1990

Group of anti-integration youths attack a police officer and a school in Dili.

May 23, 1991

Portugal responds to September 1990 proposal, agreeing to concept of visit of Parliamentary delegation; negotiations reopen.

June 27, 1991

Both countries agree on terms of visit during meeting held under auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General.

September 30 1991

Five-day visit to East Timor of advance team with U.N., Portuguese and Indonesian representatives begins.

October 1991

Visit is suddenly canceled after Portuguese renege on agreement on composition of the journalist delegation.

October 28, 1991

Fighting erupts between a group of anti-integrationist youths in the Motael Church and a group of pro-integrationist youths outside, leading to the death of one anti-integrationist and one pro-integrationist.

November 12, 1991

Memorial march to the Dili cemetery marking the death of the anti-integrationist turns violent. Security personnel, without higher command, fire into the crowd. Casualties include 50 dead and 91 wounded.

November 18, 1991

President Soeharto appoints a National Commission of Inquiry to investigate the incident.

December 26, 1992

The commission presents its preliminary report, citing army officers and civilian demonstrators as sharing responsibility for the tragedy.

December 28, 1992

President Soeharto orders Army Chief of Staff to conduct inquiry into military role.

March 3, 1992

Army reports six senior officers shared responsibility; they are dismissed or transferred. Eight other officers and soldiers will face courts-martial.

March 15–20, 1992

Trials of civilians alleged to have been organizers in the demonstrations begin in Dili and Jakarta.

April 17, 1992

After meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas announces Indonesia is prepared to resume talks with Portugal on East Timor under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General.

EAST TIMOR: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

The island of Timor is located at the eastern end of the 13,000-island Indonesian archipelago. At 34,000 square kilometers or 13,100 square miles, it is the size of the Netherlands. The province of East Timor, which occupies the eastern half of the island, is nearly 15,000 square kilometers or 6,800 square miles. The terrain of Timor is mountainous, with the northern coastal range rising almost directly from the sea. A number of mountains peak at more than 9,000 feet. A wide southern coastal plain is broken by swampy areas, river mouths and deltas. The climate is tropical, with alternating wet and dry seasons — the dry season from May to November, the rainy season from December to April.

The earliest indigenous people of Timor are the Atoni, and Tetum is the largest linguistic group on the island. Long before the arrival of European colonial powers — the Dutch and the Portuguese — Timor was visited by traders from nearby Java, and many of their descendants still call Timor home. Other non-indigenous residents include direct or mixed-race descendants of the Portuguese colonialists, Chinese, Arabs and Indians, plus a number of Indonesian citizens from other parts of the country who have settled on Timor. Chinese traders were encouraged to settle on the island since the turn of the century by the Portuguese to help promote commerce.

Accurate Census Undertaken

While Indonesia's official language, Bahasa Indonesia, is spoken throughout the province, at least 12 other languages and dialects are spoken in East Timor, ranging from the most widespread, Tetum, an Austronesian language dominant around the capital of Dili, to more obscure non-Austronesian dialects, such as Kairui, Nidiki and Baibenu.

Demographic information available on East Timor during Portuguese rule indicates very slow population growth rates that can be attributed to poor health conditions and a short life-expectancy that prevailed throughout the territory during that time. The first Indonesian census showed a 1980 population of 555,350 persons, substantially lower than the last Portuguese census of 624,564 persons in 1973. The latter figure was based on estimates by village headmen and is believed to have been inflated by these district leaders seeking to enhance the territory's importance to Portuguese authorities. The former figure was the first accurate census undertaken using Western methods of enumeration.

The Portuguese succeeded in dividing and conquering, though determined resistance meant that it was not until the last quarter of the 16th Century that the Portuguese finally succeeded in conquering some of the more remote reaches of the archipelago, particularly the lands ruled by Sultan Baabullah of Ternate, overlord of Timor. Baabullah sought an ally in the United East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) of the Netherlands, but soon discovered that he had merely exchanged one master for another as his kingdom fell under Dutch control.

Dutch Establish Presence

The Dutch pursued their expansion into Indonesia vigorously and quickly managed to drive the Portuguese from most of the islands they had seized. In 1651, Dutch forces captured Kupang, the capital of West Timor. From this base they expanded their influence throughout the next century. But East Timor's lack of readily exploitable resources and the strong opposition of the Portuguese Catholic friars to domination by the Dutch discouraged Dutch forces from pressing ahead with a seizure of the entire island.

Since the early 16th Century, when Portuguese forces conquered Timor and the surrounding islands including the Moluccas, they began disseminating the Catholicism of their homeland. The Catholic priests who sailed with the Portuguese armada to perform religious services for the crew also preached the gospel in the conquered territories, indeed, wherever the fleet landed.

It was not for another 200 years, until 1859, that a formal boundary was established defining the Dutch-controlled western Timor and Portuguese-controlled East Timor. East Timor continued to be governed by Portugal as part of the colony of Macau, the island off Hong Kong, until 1896 when the two were made separate colonies, each with its own governor. This did little, however, to improve the conditions of chronically neglected development by Lisbon, which bred social unrest in East Timor. This culminated in 1910 with a large-scale armed rebellion against the Portuguese, which took colonial forces nearly two years to suppress.

The Portuguese remained in power until World War II, when Japanese invaders succeeded in ousting the Dutch and Portuguese from both halves of Timor, as well as the rest of Indonesia and much of Southeast Asia. Three-and-a-half years of military rule led to famine and the death of at least 40,000 people in East Timor alone before the Japanese finally surrendered to Allied forces.

Indonesian Independence Achieved

It was at this moment that the people of Indonesia seized the initiative and declared their independence, embarking on four more years of armed struggle against the Dutch that culminated in agreement on an independent nation of Indonesia on December 27, 1949. At the same time, the people of East Timor were staging their own revolution seeking their independence from Portuguese rule. However, Portuguese forces succeeded in protecting their territory where the Dutch had failed. East Timor was to remain a Portuguese colony for 30 more years.

Throughout this period, however, the Portuguese maintained that Portuguese Timor was not a colonial territory but rather an "overseas province" of Portugal, a claim that was formalized in 1951 in an amendment to the Portuguese constitution. As a result, when the issue was brought before the United Nations, the Portuguese said repeatedly that U.N. resolutions and charter provisions regulating colonial peoples did not apply to East Timor. The United Nations considered the question of Portuguese Timor as part of the overall problem of the territories under Portuguese administration, regularly condemning Portugal for its refusal to permit its colonial subjects the right of self- determination.

On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese military overthrew the civilian government in Portugal, and the military, under the leadership of General Antonio de Spinola, took control of that country. Less than a month later, President Spinola declared that democratic rights would be accorded the inhabitants of the Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia, including East Timor. Twelve days later, on May 28, 1974, the Portuguese Governor and military commander, Colonel Fernando Alves Aldela, gave permission for the people of East Timor to set up political parties and open the process that was intended to culminate in a referendum on March 13, 1975. Three options were to be on the ballot — to become an autonomous territory under Portuguese rule, to become a free and independent country within or outside a Portuguese Commonwealth or to join the Republic of Indonesia as its 27th province.

Beginning in September 1974, a series of talks was held in New York and Lisbon between senior Indonesian and Portuguese officials concerning the process of decolonization of Portuguese Timor. But despite its original proclamation of the choices to be offered in a referendum, Portugal began to back off.

By October 1974, Portugal's Minister for Interterritorial Coordination, Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos, was claiming that it would be unrealistic to advocate establishment of an independent state of East Timor because its weakened political and economic condition would promptly encourage recolonization by other powers. Nevertheless, Santos agreed that the decolonization would proceed under representatives of its own people. After meeting with the Portuguese official, Indonesia's President Soeharto said that his Government had no territorial ambitions in East Timor or indeed anywhere else, was opposed to colonialism and would accept Portuguese Timor's integration with Indonesia if that was in line with the wishes of the people.

In Portuguese Timor, it was necessary to start from the beginning to establish a political structure that could result in a referendum. Before the Portuguese revolution, all political activities in the colonies had been suppressed and political parties banned with the exception of one pro-Portuguese party. Now, political parties could organize freely and five promptly sprang up:

- **Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT)**

  Formed with elements of the former pro-Portuguese party, the main goal of the UDT was to see that Portugal fulfilled its responsibility to lead Timor gradually toward independence while maintaining a privileged relationship with Portugal. The UDT was reluctant to press for immediate independence, however, since it understood that the necessary conditions of economic development did not yet exist. The UDT claimed, with considerable justification, to be the largest party in East Timor. It received the support of 230 of the 472 existing clans in the territory, or about 50 percent of the total population.

- **The Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN)**

  FRETILIN is headed by Francisco Xavier do Amaral, a tax and customs officer with links to Portugal's colonial secret police. Its secretary general is Jose Ramos Horta, a former journalist of a leading newspaper in Dili. The FRETILIN program called for immediate independence and radicalization of the entire social and economic structure of East Timor and drew its major support from radical, younger elements of the electorate. As The Far Eastern Economic Review observed on October 17, 1975:

  > *FRETILIN has all the appearances of a hastily assembled identical model of a third world independence movement. Up to six weeks ago it would have been hard to take seriously a self-important party of Dili 'intellectuals' that was formed only after General Spinola's coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, and busily acquired a Frelimo-type image through a vague collectivist ideology, a flag and an anthem.*

- **The Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI)**

  Founded May 27, 1974, it was chaired by Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, an ex-teacher who for 29 years had been imprisoned by the colonial regime. The secretary general was Jose Fernandez Osorio Soares, an intellectual and former employee of the Portuguese Timor Social Service who was later murdered by FRETILIN troops. From its inception, APODETI favored the integration of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia. Believing that the people of Portuguese Timor shared the same island with Indonesian Timor, as well as the same ancestry and cultural background, APODETI held that the separation of the two Timors was due purely to colonial politics and did not reflect ethnic, cultural or historical realities. Most of the party's supporters were in the western portion of East Timor, and its leaders played an active part in an unsuccessful 1959 revolt against Portuguese rule in which hundreds of Timorese died.

- **Klibur Oan Timur Aswain (Son of the Warriors) (KOTA Party)**

  Its aim was to preserve the authority of the "liurais" (village headmen) as the traditional leaders of the people. It supported integration with Indonesia.

- **Trabalhista Party (Labor Party)**

  Its goal was to achieve the independence of East Timor while retaining some association with Portugal, and it was closely tied to the UDT Party.

Leaders of these newly formed parties quickly began visiting Jakarta. In June 1974, Foreign Minister Adam Malik said during a visit by FRETILIN leaders that Indonesia would strictly observe a policy of non-interference in the referendum process. The FRETILIN visit to Jakarta was followed by a visit from APODETI representatives, whose chairman announced its goal of integration with Indonesia as the nation's 27th province.

The lines between the parties quickly began to blur. By January 1975, the UDT, which favored gradual independence and association with a vaguely defined Portuguese commonwealth, agreed to form a coalition with FRETILIN, which favored more radical changes and immediate independence. Reports quickly began circulating in Australia that an agreement had been reached between Portugal, the UDT and FRETILIN, transferring the government of the territory to the two parties.

This alliance of the UDT and FRETILIN, with or without Portuguese complicity, was apparently motivated by the rapid growth of popular support for APODETI and its program of integration with Indonesia. The UDT-FRETILIN alliance lasted only a few months, however, disintegrating when FRETILIN cadres who had served in the colonial army began a campaign of blackmail and terror against members of the other East Timor parties.

Portuguese military officials helped organize this campaign of terror, targeting leaders of APODETI who favored unification with Indonesia. At the same time, the Portuguese Governor continued publicly to assure the electorate that his country intended to guarantee self-determination to the people of East Timor. Nevertheless, the spreading violence led a number of pro-integrationists to flee across the border into western Timor.

Talks in London Open

This same violence led to the opening of talks in London between senior Portuguese and Indonesian officials with the aim of restoring some calm to the territory. There was an agreement for subsequent discussions between Portuguese officials and leaders of each of the East Timor political parties. The March 1975 election date passed amid bickering and violence.

In July 1975, the Portuguese Government ordered formation of a transitional government for the colony to prepare for election in October 1976 of a Popular Assembly that was to take responsibility for determining the future status of the territory. The transitional government would be headed by a High Commissioner appointed by Portugal and five members — two Portuguese members and three chosen from representatives of the East Timor political parties. Portuguese sovereignty was to be terminated in the territory as of October 1978.

In August 1975, talks resumed between Portugal and Indonesia with the aim of restoring some sense of authority in the territory. The Indonesian Government proposed a Joint Authority comprising representatives of Australia, Indonesia, Portugal and Malaysia to administer the territory after a joint military task force had brought the fighting to an end. Australia, however, refused to send troops to East Timor, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam telling Parliament that restoration of order was "the sole responsibility of Portugal" and that refugee aid would not be forthcoming until a cease-fire had been established. The concept of a multinational authority promptly collapsed. At the same time FRETILIN, which continued to expand its military activities in the territory, refused to join talks with other political parties in East Timor.

Civil War Erupts

At the same time, however, rumors of a Portuguese-supported FRETILIN coup had spread widely, leading Portugal finally to deport two of its own army majors who had been leading the underground support for FRETILIN. Undeterred, however, on August 20, 1975, FRETILIN troops descended from surrounding hills and entered Dili. Lightly armed forces of the UDT, joined by APODETI and ultimately by KOTA and Trabalhista, were forced to battle FRETILIN troops armed with heavy mortars, machine guns and artillery. A civil war had broken out.

As fighting spread, tens of thousands of East Timor residents fled across the border to Indonesian territory, placing an enormous burden on Indonesia. Yet the Portuguese Government made no serious attempt to end the bloodshed and political chaos in its territory. Instead, suddenly on August 26, 1975, the Governor and other senior Portuguese officials precipitously abandoned their posts in Dili, fleeing to the island of Atauro 20 miles outside Dili harbor.

Within a few weeks, they had abandoned even this outpost, leaving a total power vacuum in the colony that Portugal had ruled for some 300 years. With no authority to check the widening bloodshed, FRETILIN expanded its reign of terror in the territory. Using the weapons that had been supplied by the Portuguese from their arsenal, FRETILIN was able to continue its aggression for three more years.

The civil war continued to rage, with forces of the parties opposed to FRETILIN regrouping and launching a series of counterattacks. At times, fighting, including guerrilla and artillery attacks, also spilled across the border into the Indonesian territory of western Timor, resulting in casualties to Indonesian civilians. Spreading famine due to the disruption of farming by the civil war also led to raids across the border for food and cattle.

Diplomatic Efforts Continue

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the fighting continued at the United Nations and through talks between Indonesia and Portugal. Discussions in Rome in November 1975 led to a mutual conclusion by both countries that the fundamental responsibility for the orderly decolonization of Portuguese Timor lay with Portugal. However, FRETILIN stubbornly rejected this concept and on November 28, 1975, unilaterally issued a "Declaration of Independence" of East Timor and announced the formation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Two days later, the four other political parties issued a separate proclamation of independence and called for the simultaneous integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia. Announcing the formation of a Provisional Government of East Timor based in Dili, the four parties called on the Indonesian Government to supply economic and military aid and, above all, to take whatever steps necessary to protect the lives of the East Timorese people who had declared themselves to be Indonesian citizens.

Portugal promptly rejected both the FRETILIN and Provisional Government declarations, announced it still considered itself the administrative power in the territory, yet admitted in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations that it was unable to deal effectively with the situation in the territory.

Colonial Power Ends

FRETILIN remained in control of Dili. However, convinced that negotiations with FRETILIN were now impossible, the four parties that comprised the Provisional Government redoubled their efforts to retake the capital. Joined by Indonesian volunteers, the provisional forces pressed forward and captured Dili on December 7, 1975. This marked the effective end of colonial power in East Timor and led to the installation of the Provisional Government of East Timor 10 days later. With the election of Arnaldo dos Reis Araujo, leader of APODETI, as chief executive of the Provisional Government, four months of bloodshed came to an end.

At the same time, the U.N. Security Council was taking up the issue of East Timor. Following adoption of Resolution 384 (1975), the U.N. Secretary-General named Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, a U.N. official based in Geneva, as a Special Representative to assess the situation. Beginning in January 1976, the U.N. envoy traveled to Jakarta and East Timor, meeting representatives of the Indonesian Government and, in Dili, leaders of the Provisional Government. He also met with officials of FRETILIN in the town of Oecussi and later in Darwin and Melbourne in Australia, though he was not able for security reasons to travel farther through the interior of East Timor. He then returned to New York, where he reported to the Secretary-General. As he concluded in the second of two reports he presented to the Secretary-General, his efforts to assess the situation were unsuccessful: "Under the circumstances...it was not possible to assess accurately the prevailing situation in East Timor...."

Both the Provisional Government in East Timor and the Indonesian Government believed that in the absence of the Portuguese, the United Nations had an important role to play in the completion of the decolonization process in the former Portuguese territory, though not a mandatory role under international law or U.N. regulations. However, repeated invitations by Indonesia and the Provisional Government of East Timor for U.N. envoys to return to the territory in 1976 were refused, including a plea for U.N. supervision of the process of self-determination.

POLITICS, GOVERNMENT AND CULTURE OF EAST TIMOR

It soon became clear that there was widespread reluctance at the United Nations to take any major actions to insert itself into the process of decolonization. This was due in part to perceptions of East Timor as a small territory of little strategic significance, with a 400-year colonial legacy of neglect. Awareness was another key issue, since few people outside the Asian region had even heard of East Timor. Many U.N. representatives expressed grave doubts as to the economic viability of the territory, should it become independent. Other nations expressed apprehension at the prospect of an extended and violent conflict and the accompanying power vacuum as potentially spreading instability beyond Timor's immediate borders in a region that had successfully managed to avoid much of the turmoil that affected other parts of Southeast Asia during the conflicts in Indochina.

Still, despite the refusal of the United Nations to participate in oversight of the transition to civilian rule, the people of East Timor needed an elected government. So, the Provisional Government proceeded to establish a process that involved election of two delegates from each of the 13 electoral districts in the territory, with an additional delegate from Dili due to the density of the population in the capital. In addition to these 27 representatives, 10 other prominent leaders from various disciplines were to be appointed by the Provisional Government. These 37 representatives would constitute the new People's Assembly.

Provisional Government Requests U.N. Representation

Representatives of the Provisional Government visited New York and Geneva in an ongoing effort to seek U.N. representation or at least first-hand observation of the transition to post-colonial rule. The Provisional Government continued to file reports with the Secretary-General of the United Nations at every stage of the process. Finally, on May 31, 1976, the popularly elected People's Assembly of East Timor decided, in an open session, with members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Jakarta present as well as the international press, to request formally that the Government of Indonesia accept the decision of the people of the territory for integration with the Republic of Indonesia as the 27th province.

On June 7, 1976, a delegation of the People's Assembly and the Provisional Government formally presented to President Soeharto the official request to become a part of the nation of Indonesia. A month later, the Indonesian Parliament approved the integration bill that was promulgated on July 17, 1976.

As President Soeharto observed during his 1976 State Address:

> *Time and again we have stated that the East Timor problem is a question of self-determination. It is a problem of abolishing colonialism...The fate of the people of East Timor can only be decided by themselves and right there on the soil of East Timor. Not in New York, not in Lisbon and not even in Jakarta. Now the people of East Timor have made the decision about their own future, namely integration with the people and the state of the Republic of Indonesia. There is no other way, therefore, but to accept with full responsibility such an integration.*

Immediately, the new government began organizing a provincial administration to provide essential services to the new Indonesian province. Administered by a governor, East Timor consists of 13 kabupatens or regions, and 64 kecamatans or districts with each kecamatan comprising several villages, each in turn led by a village head. A bupati heads each kabupaten and a camat is in charge of each kecamatan. This is identical to the governing structures in the other Indonesian provinces.

The most immediate problem was personnel, since during the colonial period few East Timorese occupied any government or administrative positions. Illiteracy was also widespread. As a result, among the first orders of business was training for all levels of government personnel.

Humanitarian Program Begins

The Indonesian Government promptly dispatched trucks and helicopters, as well as relief personnel. By June 1980, nearly 74,000 individuals had been supplied with assistance. Since the Fall of 1979, Catholic Relief Services and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have also been operating throughout East Timor, distributing food and medical assistance by truck and helicopter to even the most remote villages. These efforts, coupled with larger programs carried out by the central and regional governments, have provided basic human needs to people throughout the province.

DEVELOPMENT AND EAST TIMOR

By any number of measures, Indonesia has one of the world's most valuable collections of natural resources — deposits of oil (it is the only Asian member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and a range of minerals, lush rain forests and rich land that supports vast agricultural production. International trade in commodities and manufactured goods plays an increasingly important role in the Indonesian economy. Its two-way trade with the United States alone is larger than that between the U.S. and all of Eastern Europe.

As the world's fourth most populous nation, it is also rich in human resources that are, however, as much an enormous challenge as an unparalleled gift. By history and nature some parts of Indonesia and some of its people are more advanced than others along the road to development. Indonesia's challenge is to spread its wealth and opportunities, so that all of its people can benefit from the tremendous progress the country is achieving. Each of its 27 provinces, its more than 13,000 islands, plays an important role in the nation's development.

East Timor is one of those areas of particular challenge. As a direct result of 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule, as they embarked on their new status as Indonesia's newest citizens, almost all of the population of East Timor found themselves substantially behind their fellow Indonesians in many aspects of their lives. At the time of integration, more than 80 percent of the population was illiterate, many were isolated in remote villages with no roads or means of communicating with the outside world, agriculture was of the most primitive subsistence nature. In short, much of the 20th Century had passed them by. This was the Portuguese legacy to the people of East Timor — poverty and isolation.

Recognizing the urgent need to provide not only basic human needs but also a foundation for future development, Indonesia has devoted six times as much of its own economic development budget to East Timor on a per capita basis than to any other province.

In 1991, East Timor received some $170 million in Indonesian Government grants. This is almost exactly 100 times the average yearly development expenditure for East Timor in the final period of Portuguese rule. And all those Portuguese development funds were in the form of repayable loans rather than outright grants. But Indonesia has also been instrumental in channeling international development funds to East Timor, as well. For example, the United States has provided more than twice as many project dollars under the Agency for International Development programs to East Timor than to the rest of Indonesia.

During the first six months of integration, a survey was conducted to determine the precise nature of the needs of Indonesia's newest province if it was to achieve the development it so desperately needed. This inventory established six priorities:

- The return of law and order in all parts of the province.
- The improvement of the administrative system and government for the province, including delivery of social and educational services.
- Redressing the imbalance between natural energy resources and the size of the population.
- Improving the primitive conditions of the infrastructure, particularly roads and telephones, that made communication among the regions difficult if not impossible.
- Raising the low level of health, education and nutrition of the population and improving the delivery of public social services, particularly in the new nuclear villages in the more remote rural areas.
- Raising the purchasing power of the population.

The following are some graphic figures that demonstrate how the Indonesian Government addressed these issues.

- The number of schools grew from 47 elementary schools, two middle schools and one high school and no college serving the entire population at the end of Portuguese rule to 579 elementary schools, 90 middle schools, 39 high schools and three colleges serving a population of 750,000 today.
- The number of hospitals and clinics grew from two hospitals and 14 clinics with three doctors and two dentists in 1974 to 10 hospitals and 197 village health centers staffed by 104 doctors, six specialists and 14 dentists, assisted by more than 1,500 paramedics today.

- The 20 kilometers (12 miles) of paved roads in 1974, all within the capital, Dili, have grown to 536 kilometers (333 miles) of asphalt roads throughout the province today.

- In 1974 East Timor had 100 churches. Today it has 793.

Following the first six-month development phase in which the inventory of priorities was established, the second, or consolidation phase, occupied East Timor's first full year as a province — from April 1977 through March 1978. During this phase efforts were made to deal with immediate critical problems of humanitarian aid to refugees and the most severely affected of the rural population while at the same time building a government and administrative structure that would be able to channel development resources efficiently and productively.

By the start of Repelita III (the Third Five-Year National Development Plan) for Indonesia in 1979, East Timor was in a position to take advantage of the plentiful resources that were being earmarked for its use. Indonesian development funds alone expended in East Timor rose from 2.26 billion Rupiahs ($5.3 million) in 1976-77 to 51.7 billion Rupiahs ($53.3 million) in 1983-84.

As Repelita IV (the Fourth Five-Year National Development Plan) began in 1985, development efforts expanded in all of the key targeted sectors.

AGRICULTURE

Land ownership, use and especially increase in productivity have been a top priority of the development efforts in East Timor. A detailed survey of the entire arable territory has been under way for more than a decade. Nearly 1,000 certificates of land ownership have been distributed to residents of the Dili area alone. The purpose of distributing land ownership certificates is to encourage stability and continuity in land cultivation, which is vital if productivity is to increase and modern practices of soil conservation instituted. The distribution of land ownership also has differed markedly from the colonial period when certificates were doled out parsimoniously and then almost entirely to Portuguese settlers or their descendants.

During the colonial period, the quality of the soil was seriously compromised by the primitive system of shift farming on unirrigated arable land as well as the disorganized methods of raising domestic animals. The extensive rain forests that covered much of East Timor were also destroyed during this period, leading to erosion and widespread flooding.

Agriculture continues to account for the employment of 80 percent of the population of East Timor. Historically, most production was carried out with the simplest of tools and techniques resulting in yields far below what should have been obtained. The priority for the Portuguese administration was the single valuable cash crop — coffee. A superb and highly desired grade of coffee has been produced for centuries on East Timor and has been the territory's most valuable export.

As a result, during the colonial period, far less attention was paid to the cultivation of food crops, such as rice and corn, though they have been and remain the staple food of all communities on the island. According to Portuguese statistics, the highest production level of food crops under their administration was reached in 1970. With the start of the upheavals in 1974, food production began dropping sharply. By 1976 it had fallen to a quarter of its 1970 level. Only 8,005 tons of paddy crops were harvested in 1976 to feed the entire population of some 555,000. But then, with increased government support, a gradual upturn began. Yield from paddy crops rose from 16,000 tons in 1979 to 22,500 tons a year later. In part, this is due to the increase in paddy acreage under cultivation, which increased fourfold in four years — from 5,180 hectares in 1978 to 20,482 hectares in 1982. By 1989, some 47,800 tons of paddy crops were produced and last year that was increased to more than 55,090 tons. Corn was grown on 22,876 hectares in 1978, while 73,408 hectares were under cultivation four years later.

Infrastructure and Facilities Improved

Increasing the acreage under cultivation was only one priority. There were also accelerated efforts to rehabilitate the agriculture infrastructure and facilities — repairing old irrigation systems and building new ones. Around the town of Bobonaro alone, for instance, an irrigation system was built to irrigate some 10,000 hectares of rice fields.

The systems have been built with the financial and logistical assistance of the Indonesian Government and with the full participation of each village and each family. In the village of Leolima [Ainaro], local farmers and their families dug canals to irrigate some 90 percent of the rice fields throughout the area. All these efforts paid off in substantial increases in yields. In many districts rice productivity has reached four to 4.5 tons per hectare, compared with one ton per hectare at the time Portuguese rule ended.

In addition to crops, livestock farming was particularly hard hit by the years of civil war in the mid 1970s. But concerted efforts at rebuilding herds are beginning to pay off. In the four years between 1978 and 1982, the number of cattle more than doubled, and within the first five years after integration, more than 10,000 cattle and water buffalo have been supplied by the national government. By 1989, East Timor herds counted some 63,612 cattle — more than double the figure from a decade before. Last year, the number of cattle increased to 68,028. In the same period the number of cattle increased so significantly, the number of swine rose from 64,013 to 256,031.

But while the immediate focus has been to rebuild the food production capacity of East Timor — the ability of the province to feed its own people — it is clear that at least near-term, much of the future prosperity of East Timor will depend heavily on sustaining production of the coffee plantations left behind by the Portuguese. Ninety percent of the territory's total exports in the colonial years came from the coffee plantations. The rich Arabica and Robusta beans from Timor were much sought-after by the international coffee market.

With the departure of the Portuguese experts after Lisbon abandoned its colony, the production of coffee dropped sharply. Replanting efforts were all but abandoned as workers fled the plantations. An early priority of the new provincial government of East Timor was to resume the replanting and cultivation of the plantations — cloves and coconuts in addition to coffee.

Crop Diversification Intensified

In the first four years after the end of colonial rule, more than one million Arabica and Robusta coffee seedlings and another million clove seedlings were distributed to the population, broadening the base of cultivation beyond the former large plantations. In coffee alone, this represented the replanting of some 10,000 hectares. By 1990, more than 7,347 tons of coffee were being produced. Another 10,000 hectares have been planted in young sugar cane in an effort to diversify production into another cash crop.

The Indonesian Government realized from the outset that the dependence of an impoverished region like East Timor on a single cash crop left the province at the mercy of uncontrollable forces on international commodity markets. Indeed, in the past, the fortunes of the colony fluctuated considerably under the Portuguese, depending on movements in world coffee prices. By diversifying into a number of cash crops, this risk to the province's economic stability could be eased.

The waters around East Timor are as rich as the most productive agricultural land. Yet under colonial management little or no attention was paid to developing a viable commercial fishing industry. Now, fishermen are being encouraged to develop their fleet with new boats and nets provided by the Government, and they are being trained in the latest techniques. In 1989, some 7,000 East Timorese fishermen produced some 680 tons of fish. Yet that is still estimated to be only 3 percent of the province's potential.

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

While 90 percent of the working-age population is employed in agriculture, the Indonesian Government has made major efforts in developing trade and small-scale industry. More than 300 commercial licenses have been issued for the opening of businesses in East Timor since integration, compared with the 67 that were issued when the territory became a province. The Government has also established special commercial and managerial courses designed to develop entrepreneurs who would also be able to make use of the bank credits that the government is issuing at below-market interest rates. Three major national banks have opened branches in East Timor.

The emphasis on industrial growth has been largely directed toward processing agricultural products and promotion of local handicraft industries including straw and textile weaving. Since East Timor became a province, new industries that have also been established, in addition to sugar and coffee-processing facilities, include factories involved with printing, soap manufacturing and electrical equipment assembly. Special vocational training courses have been introduced. As the infrastructure support increases, the intention is to move into the development of assembling and manufacturing industries, thus providing a number of labor-intensive jobs.

The nature of the rugged, mountainous terrain of East Timor made development of a modern system of roads and telecommunications another early priority of development assistance. During the colonial period little effort was made to expand the highway and communications network into the interior. Indeed, what links were built were designed to serve the interests of the colonial administration, particularly with respect to tax collection and transport of the coffee crop to foreign markets.

During the entire 450 years of Portuguese rule, only one paved road 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) long was built-and that was through Dili. Today, more than 3,800 kilometers (2,360 miles) of roads have been built, including 428 kilometers (266 miles) of paved highways, as well as 18 bridges.

Transportation Systems Enhanced

In the first year after integration, the number of motor vehicles in the province increased fourfold. Scores of bus routes were established to link dozens of towns and villages. The number of buses in service increased from 16 in 1976 to 187 in 1989. Passenger cars increased elevenfold in the same period — from 171 to 1,964, and the number of trucks rose from 262 to 1,567. The number of motorcycles (the transportation of choice particularly into the more remote reaches of the interior) rose from 878 in 1976 to 5,476 in 1989.

In air transport, two major airlines serve Dili's Komoro Airport, completed in 1981 — Garuda, the Indonesian national airline, and Merpati Nusantara Airlines. A second airport capable of handling DC-10s has been built in the town of Baucau at the eastern end of the island, and a helicopter field also serves the capital. Scheduled passenger and cargo ships connect East Timor to the rest of Indonesia.

Telecommunications have also been substantially improved. East Timor is now linked with all other Indonesian provinces through Indonesia's Palapa satellite, which also ties the province into international telephone and television circuits. A new automatic telephone switching system has also been installed in Dili.

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

All of these development measures, however, will be useless without a substantial expansion in educational opportunities and a move toward eradicating the widespread illiteracy that marked the colonial years. Every Indonesian citizen has the right to acquire the educational tools required for personal growth and advancement, and so be able to take an active part in the process of national development. At the start of the post-colonial period, more than 80 percent of all East Timorese were illiterate — indeed, 78 percent had never been inside a school. The most urgent need was for new classrooms and new teachers. The first priority was to enroll as many as possible of those who were of school age no matter where they were located in the province. This divided itself into two projects. The first was to build classrooms. The number of schools grew from 50 schools serving the entire population at the end of Portuguese rule, to 673 schools and three colleges serving a population of 750,000 in 1991.

The second project involved finding qualified teachers. This required recruitment from throughout the nation to meet this urgent need. While the national language of Bahasa Indonesia is taught in schools in all Indonesian provinces, the broad variety of local languages and dialects in East Timor is recognized as part of the indigenous culture. The emphasis now is on developing sufficient numbers of East Timorese teachers to take over instruction of their own people. Graduates of East Timor high schools and colleges are being encouraged to pursue higher education not only in the province but also at universities in Malang, Jakarta and Denpasar. In 1989, more than 1,500 East Timorese students obtained university scholarships.

Focus on Eradicating Health Problems

Eradicating serious health problems has taken its place alongside eradication of illiteracy as a major development priority. In 1970, more than 66,000 people, or nearly 11 percent of the population of East Timor, were reported to be suffering from malaria. As was the case with education, correcting health problems required massive improvements in delivery systems. The nearly 2,000 health care professionals, working in more than 200 facilities, are battling with considerable success the range of diseases that affect people throughout the province.

At the same time, sanitation programs to improve health conditions are also being undertaken by Indonesian authorities. The construction of hundreds of small reservoirs to collect rain water and drilling of wells will, in the first instance, remove many of the breeding grounds for malaria-carrying mosquitoes and at the same time provide potable drinking water for the population.

In cooperation with UNICEF, child, mother and family welfare improvement programs are being opened. While family planning is being encouraged, East Timor is still seriously underpopulated — many living in villages of just a few families, scattered and isolated in remote and mountainous areas in conditions of almost total neglect. This poses a serious obstacle to promoting social and economic development of the region. In recognition of this problem the Government has focused on rural development and on strengthening village infrastructures.

RELIGION

Throughout the development process, the goals of the national and provincial governments have been identical — to promote tolerance and a better life for all the people of Indonesia. Freedom of religion plays an important role here. While Indonesia is the world's largest Islamic community, there is no official state religion —

indeed, members of all religions are free to worship as they choose. Despite some 450 years of Portuguese rule, more than half the population of East Timor practices animism. Nevertheless, Catholicism remains the largest single organized religion in the province.

In 1974, at the end of Portuguese rule, there were 100 churches in the territory. Today there are 793, including the spectacular Immaculata Cathedral in Dili. Catholic Relief Services runs a number of social services programs in the province, and the Government has provided allowances for priests and nuns.

In short, the national and provincial governments are working together in a broad range of social and economic development areas to improve the quality of life of the people of East Timor.

ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN EAST TIMOR

One of the principal goals of the integration of East Timor into Indonesia was an end to the bloodshed and instability that marked the years of civil war and political strife that followed the precipitous Portuguese abandonment of their colony.

Restoration of a measure of security was a prerequisite for any of the development programs, particularly in the more remote regions of the interior where forces of FRETILIN retreated after they were driven from Dili and a provincial government established. During the period of Repelita IV (the Fourth Five-Year Plan from 1984 to 1989) there was a clear and measurable improvement in the internal security of East Timor. Nevertheless, where anti-Indonesia forces continued to commit acts of terrorism or other crimes against the population or security forces, the Government has not hesitated to take resolute measures against them.

This is not say that peaceful political opposition has not been encouraged. All dissident elements who emerged from the mountains and surrendered following the conflicts at the time of separation from Portuguese rule were covered under a general amnesty. In 1982, the residents of East Timor participated in the first national election campaign held under their new status as Indonesia's 27th province. Voters elected members of the national House of Representatives (Parliament) and a provincial parliament, as well.

The electoral process involved two steps — a population census and a campaign before the day of balloting. During the population census, the election officials met with every individual, even in the most remote areas, to reach an accurate count of the voting population and to make certain those who wished to vote were aware of the process. Often, the election officials had to ride horses or pick their way on foot along mountain ridges to reach the inhabitants of the most remote areas. In this first election, more than 300,000 persons cast their ballots, electing four representatives to the national parliament and 40 to the provincial legislature.

Represented in the balloting were three social-political groups in East Timor — the Functional Group (Golongan Karya), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and the Democratic Party of Indonesia (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). In March 1983, eight representatives of East Timor took their places as members of the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly. Five years later, the people of East Timor again participated with the rest of Indonesia in general elections, as they will every five years.

East Timorese Participate in Election Process

Through their participation in this democratic process, the people of East Timor have three times over the past 15 years reaffirmed their desire to live like the rest of the citizens of Indonesia in a peaceful, secure and orderly society. The country's security forces have worked to ensure peace and stability in the province as they do throughout Indonesia.

From time to time, however, public demonstrations staged by a small group advocating the province's independence have taken place in Dili and in other parts of East Timor. According to the report of a presidential commission, at least seven incidents have occurred in the provincial capital over the past two years. This was the purpose of a demonstration on November 12, 1991, when a march in the East Timor capital turned into a bloody political conflict. Fifty individuals were killed and 91 others wounded when the march turned violent and security forces fired into the crowd.

President Soeharto and other leading government officials promptly condemned the activities of the military officers who led or participated in the bloodshed, and a number were subsequently removed or demoted. Today, it is clear that the Government of Indonesia, as well as provincial authorities, is anxious to make every effort to assure that such incidents do not occur again.

Moreover, the continuing economic progress and development of East Timor, the opportunities for young people to lead rewarding lives as citizens of Indonesia, the desire of foreign governments for a strong, stable anchor in this part of Southeast Asia, will all combine to produce the kind of atmosphere on and off the island of Timor that will hopefully continue to reduce agitation and civil disorder throughout the province.

THE FUTURE OF EAST TIMOR

The real future of East Timor and Indonesia lies in the promise of its people. The past is no longer prelude. The colonial era is behind Indonesia and each of its provinces. With investment and economic development assistance pouring into the country without interruption, with new incentives for foreign partnerships in all sectors of Indonesian commerce and industry, all of Indonesia's diverse provinces promise to profit.

For nearly five centuries, Timor was exploited for the benefit of foreign colonial powers. For them the colonial responsibility was a one-way street — they took as much as they were able and gave as little as they could to make life comfortable for themselves. Today, as part of an independent and growing Indonesia, East Timor is only at the beginning of tapping its mineral and agricultural potential, building a modern infrastructure and establishing commerce and industry for the benefit of the East Timorese.

It will take considerable energy, resources and, above all, commitment to achieve this goal. The Government of Indonesia is as committed as its citizens in its 27th province to making East Timor a productive and growing part of the nation. From the beginning of Repelita V, the Fifth Five-Year Plan for Indonesia that began in 1989 and will conclude in 1993, the commitment in every area of social and economic development is clear. In agriculture, development funding is increasing twelvefold in the course of the five years covered by the plan, to 9.7 billion Rupiah or $4.5 million. Development of mines and energy resources will be increasing more than fivefold to 2.8 billion Rupiah or $1.4 million.

The extraordinary effort being made to build roads, bridges and similar infrastructure is clear by the sixteenfold increase in public works appropriations to 37.7 billion Rupiah or $18.8 million. And this is only a sampling of the broad range of development programs under way and funded by the Indonesian Government in areas from education and culture to industrial development, health, forestry, telecommunications and family planning.

In all, expenditures in East Timor are projected to rise from 15.7 billion Rupiah ($7.8 million) in 1989 to 96.9 billion Rupiah or $48.5 million in 1993 — a more than sixfold increase in five years — a staggering commitment for one of 27 Indonesian provinces. And Repelita VI (the Sixth Five-Year Plan), now in the final stages of preparation, is expected only to accelerate the pace of development in the province. At the same time, Indonesia is eager to encourage foreign investment in East Timor, particularly with respect to development of natural resources and industry that will mean more and better jobs and a higher standard of living for all the residents of the region.

Development Assistance Continues

Foreign development assistance under the current Five-Year Plan is continuing unabated from the United States, Australia, UNICEF and numerous other foreign nations and international organizations. Indonesia is anxious that this assistance for the people of East Timor continue and is prepared to welcome visitors to demonstrate the progress that has been made in the province.

Clearly there are those who would derail for their own personal gain many of the processes now under way. The motives they express may appear pure. But in the final analysis, there remains the real question as to how those who would prefer to sever ties with Indonesia envision accelerating the process of development and improvement in the quality of life of the people of this island province.

Indonesia is one of the developing world's true success stories. It is a nation that has managed, against all odds, to unite under one banner a multitude of cultures, languages, histories and religions all with a single goal — personal advancement of the individual and collective advancement of the nation. It is a strong, stable anchor in a strategic region known in the past for its chronic instability and strife. And all of its peoples — from Sumatra to East Timor — share this vision of a future of peaceful development and individual opportunity.

EPILOGUE

There remains, however, another, darker vision that some in the international community retain for the people of East Timor — a vision that is a legacy of its colonial past. This vision would replay the events of two decades ago, turn back the clock on the progress in development and democracy that has improved the lives for all the people of this province, and promises to threaten the very stability of a corner of Asia that has been uniquely isolated from the strife and turmoil that have marked other parts of this region in the past half-century.

This vision preys on the legitimate concerns of those who value and respect the rights of man, while distorting the record of Indonesia and its people. Moreover, those who hold this vision ignore the good-faith efforts that have been brought to bear on behalf of the people of East Timor to assure that their rights are respected, that their lives are improved. And these advocates ignore the historical record of abandonment and arrogance displayed by East Timor's former colonial master — Portugal, which leads the chorus of those who would deny the history of the last two decades.

Nevertheless, and despite a campaign of vilification combined with historical distortion, Indonesia has repeatedly affirmed its willingness to discuss a resolution of the issue of the future of East Timor with Portugal under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General. The goal would be, as it has from the moment Portugal summarily abandoned its stewardship in August 1975, to find a formula that would at once recognize contemporary reality and allow those who would return to the past to find a means of joining the people of East Timor in building a better and more certain future for their children, as well as for themselves.

Portugal Abdicates Responsibility

History shows that no two cases of decolonization are exactly the same. In each case the process must recognize the realities of the specific territory. From the moment in 1975 when Portugal and its authorities in the territory abandoned their post, turning over their store of weapons to one of the factions contesting for power in post-colonial East Timor, the result was civil war. Ever since, whether through collective guilt or 20-20 hindsight, Portugal has sought to put Indonesia in the international dock of world opinion — and failed. At the point of Portuguese abandonment, no subversion was at work — except from within. The people of East Timor awoke one day to the harsh reality that they had been abandoned —that they had no more government, no law, no order. Facing anarchy, they turned to Indonesia through their popularly elected representatives, and it accepted the responsibility that Portugal had rejected.

By what right, then, it might be asked, does Portugal seek to reassert its 17-year-old claim as the "administering authority" of this province? By what right does it demand negotiation on this issue? A popularly selected provincial parliament voted on May 31, 1976, to seek integration with the Republic of Indonesia. This plebiscite conforms with every conventional standard of international law.

Yet Indonesia is prepared to meet with Portugal, under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General, to remove the final obstacle to a peaceful and productive future for East Timor.

For the past decade, Indonesia has said that the Secretary-General should find a solution that is acceptable to both sides. And acceptable to the international community, as well. But it is equally clear that there can be no turning back the clock. Decolonization has taken place. Any solution must recognize that, yet still be internationally acceptable. This is how the talks started 10 years ago — tripartite talks on the question of East Timor between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

Despite a series of Indonesian proposals over the past decade, it took until 1986 for Portugal, Indonesia and the United Nations to arrive at a formula. An official U.N. mission would visit Indonesia and East Timor during the 1987 elections. They would go to East Timor, but they would also split up and visit other parts of Indonesia — observing the general elections in East Timor, talking with the people there, asking questions, observing every aspect of the electoral process.

The result would be a report to the U.N. General Assembly. Certainly, as in any pluralistic society, the observers would have heard some dissenting voices. But Indonesian officials were confident that the observers would see the overwhelming majority of the people peacefully and freely participating in general elections as part of a democratic Indonesia. A full General Assembly debate, it was anticipated, would follow submission of the observer report. Then, Indonesian officials confidently expected a vote to resolve the East Timor debate once and for all.

This solution of 1986 remains, with some modifications, workable today. It failed then because Portugal, at the last minute, pulled out, refusing to participate in the observer mission, though Indonesia had agreed — despite all the uncertainties of an independent commission and independent report.

Since 1987, a new proposal has been submitted. Portugal proposed that a parliamentary mission visit East Timor. Again, Indonesia agreed with the plan to dispatch a Portuguese parliamentary delegation, along with a small group representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But again, Portugal created disagreement at the very moment when hope was so strong, and the visit was canceled.

Today, one more time, it is being proposed that talks be reopened. A solution must be reached for the benefit of the people of East Timor and their fellow Indonesians. Energy and resources should be committed to the ongoing task of political, social and economic development that is filling the vacuum left by centuries of abuse and neglect. They deserve no less.